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Introduction
In Stewart v. Abend, the United States Supreme
Court followed the ruling in Miller Music Corp. v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc. and held that the copyright
of a derivative work expires if the underlying work's
owner dies before assigning the renewal of the
derivative work's copyright in the last year of the
copyright's original term.'The Supreme Court
ruled in favor of respondent Sheldon Abend against
petitioners James Stewart, Alfred Hitchcock, MCA
Inc., and Universal Film Exchanges for copyright
infringement. The Court held that the petitioners'
motion picture rights to respondent's story expired
when the original author of the story died before
assigning the renewal rights of the motion picture
to petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners' distribution
of the film "Rear Window" after the original term of
their copyright expired was an unlawful infringe-
ment on respondent's copyright of the film's under-
lying story, "It Had to Be Murder."
Facts
In 1942, Cornell Woolrich first published his story,
"It Had to Be Murder." He then assigned the rights
to make a motion picture version of the story to De
Sylva Productions and agreed to renew the copy-
right in the story at the appropriate time and assign
the renewal rights of the motion picture to De Sylva
Productions. In 1953, the production company
owned by petitioners Stewart and Hitchcock
bought the motion picture rights to Woolrich's story
from De Sylva's successors in interest and produced
and distributed "Rear Window," the film based on
"It Had to Be Murder." However, Woolrich died in
1968 before renewing his copyright in the story and
assigning the renewal rights of the motion picture
to petitioners. Subsequently, Woolrich's executor
assigned the renewal rights to respondent Sheldon
Abend entitling him to 10% of all proceeds from the
exploitation of the story. "Rear Window" was broad-
cast on AB C television in 1971, at which time Abend
notified petitioners that their distribution of the
film infringed upon his copyright in "It Had to Be
Murder." Regardless, petitioners contracted to re-
broadcast the film.
In 1974, Abend filed a copyright infringment suit
against petitioners in a United States District
Court that resulted in a settlement of $25,000.
Several years later petitioners re-released and pub-
licly exhibited "Rear Window" in reliance on the
1977 Second Circuit decision in Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc. which held the owner of the copyright
in a derivative work may continue to exploit that
work even if the grant of rights in the pre-existing
work expired.2 Respondent then brought this copy-
right infringment suit against petitioners alleging
that Woolrich's failure to register and transfer his
renewal rights to petitioners caused petitioners'
motion picture rights to lapse at the end of the
original copyright term.
The District Court granted petitioners' motion for
summary judgment based on Rohauer and the "fair
use" defense. The Court of Appeals reversed in
favor of respondent, rejecting the reasoning of Ro-
hauer and relying upon the ruling in Miller Music
Corp. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals and Rohauer.
Legal Analysis
Petitioners asserted that once an original author
agrees to assign his renewal rights for derivative
use of his story those rights are extinguished upon
the story's incorporation into the derivative work.3
Accordingly, when Woolrich agreed to assign his
renewal rights for motion picture use of his story,
those rights extinguished upon the incorporation of
"It Had to Be Murder" into the film "Rear Window."
Since a person who creates a derivative work often
contributes the same if not more creative effort to
his derivative work as the author of the underlying
work, petitioners asserted that such a derivative
work deserves protection from the loss of promised
renewal rights.4
In interpreting Section 24 of the Copyright Act of
1909 and of 1976 and the legislative history, the
Supreme Court found no support for petitioners'
argument. Section 24 of the 1976 Act states:
If the author [of a copyrighted work] be not
living... then the author's executors... shall
be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for a further term of
twenty-eight years when application for such
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renewal and extension shall have been made
to the copyright office and duly registered
therein within one year prior to the expiration
of the original term of copyright. 5
The Court explained that Congress created a two-
term system of copyright ownership protection to
compensate for the author's inferior bargaining
position in originally assigning derivative rights to
his work. The renewal provisions permit the author
to renegotiate the terms of the grant after the work
has been exploited and its value has been assessed
in derivative forms. In this way, the policy promotes
the interests of the author by allowing him a second
opportunity to receive just compensation for his
underlying work, and, in the case of the author's
death prior to the renewal period, by providing a
"new estate" for his surviving family or executors.6
Accordingly, upon the death of the author prior to
the renewal period, the owner of the rights to the
derivative work may continue to use the underlying
work only if the author's successor assigns the
renewal rights to him.7 Until the renewal rights are
actually assigned, the owner of the rights to the
derivative work has merely an expectancy interest
in those renewable rights.8 In this case, Woolrich's
death prior to the time for renewal left petitioner's
expectancy interest in the renewal rights to the
motion picture unfulfilled and unenforceable.
The owner of the pre-existing work maintains his
statutory rights in the renewal term. Although the
derivative author's original contributions to his
work are his property under Sections 7 and 103(b)
of the Copyright Act, the elements of the pre-exist-
ing work which are incorporated in the derivative
work remain on grant from the owner of the pre-ex-
isting work.9 So long as the underlying work itself
remains copyrighted, the derivative owner cannot
infringe on the use of those parts of the underlying
work incorporated in the derivative work.
In furtherance of their argument that Woolrich's
rights in the derivative use of his story extin-
guished upon the story's incorporation into the
derivative work, petitioners pointed to the termina-
tion provisions of the 1976 Act. These provisions
allowed the underlying author to terminate any
grant of rights at the end of the renewal term except
the right to use a derivative work after two valid
copyright terms. 0 Accordingly, petitioners asserted
that the termination provisions attested to the lim-
ited rights of the underlying author to control the
assigned rights to use the derivative work. Again,
the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' conten-
tion. The Court asserted that Congress specifically
created an exception for derivative works in the
termination provisions precisely because it as-
sumed that the owner of an underlying work was
able to sue for copyright infringment despite that
work's incorporation in the derivative work.
Finally, petitioners argued that this Court's ruling
would undermine the Copyright Act's policy of pro-
moting the dissemination of creative works. How-
ever, the Court stated that the Copyright Act was
designed to balance the sometimes conflicting in-
terests of the artist and the public. While the artist
has a right to control his work under copyright
protection, that protection is limited to allow the
public access to creative works. The two-term copy-
right system simply allows the artist to maintain
the necessary bargaining power to insure his just
reward for his creative efforts."
Conclusion
The dissenting justices made a strong argument
providing protection for the owner of a derivative
work. They asserted that the original drafts of the
copyright bill intended the nature of a derivative
work as a whole to be determinative of the duration
and extent of copyright protection rather than the
contribution of the underlying author. In this way,
the derivative copyright was understood to encom-
pass the entire derivative work, including the un-
derlying work contributions, and thereby provide
for the derivative work's independence from the
underlying work.12 However, the majority ulti-
mately rejected this argument by interpreting con-
gressional policy to favor the rights of the underly-
ing work's owner. 0
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